Abstract
Introduction
Software has been vulnerable to copyright infringements due to illegal copies and distributions. Thus it is important for software developers to conceal the program's core sources code or flow when they build software binaries. So, many obfuscation techniques or anti-debugging techniques were applied to binary files [1] . Anti-debugging techniques refer to various ways of preventing binary files from being analyzed in debuggers or other virtual machine environments.
As many debuggers or analyzing tools being developed rapidly, some developers try to avoid debugging through anti-debugging APIs or other techniques [2] . To avoid antidebugging techniques, analysts trick binary files as if they are not in the analyzing environments using plug-ins for debuggers. Using plug-ins for debuggers reduces the debugger's performance and the tracing speed. In addition, some anti-debugging techniques can still detect the debugging environments, so execution results may be different in the debugging environments.
In this paper, we propose a method to avoid anti-debugging techniques by analyzing assembly instructions. Our proposed method analyzes and traces the general-purpose register values to find out whether anti-debugging instructions exist, using anti-anti-debugging rule sets. Our rule-based method, each time a new technology appears, can add or remove anti-anti debugging rules quickly. In addition, because this method do not execute program in debugger environments, it does not be detected by dynamic anti-debugging techniques. After spotting the sections containing anti-debugging instructions, our Evading Anti-debugging techniques tool patches the instructions with new instructions. Experimental results showed that our method can remove anti-debugging instructions from malware.
Background

Assembly Instruction
Assembly language is a programming language directly corresponding to machine code, and for Windows PE (portable executable) files. There exist several disassemblers or debuggers, such as borg disassembler [3] , ollydbg [4] , ImmunityDebugger [5] , and IDA Pro [6] . Malware can be analyzed with assembly instructions generated from these disassemblers. Additionally, some disassemblers provide address or register information for some instructions, so analysts can apprehend detailed execution process with this information. As shown in Figure 1 , Anti-debugging technologies can also detect which Anti-debugging API is called from instructions.
In addition, assembly instructions include General Purpose registers [7] , such as EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESI, EDI, ESP, and EBP. These registers are used to save address values, and could be used in API calls or flag references. Thus, analysts can understand the program executions if they know the information in registers or the information that a certain instruction references. Anti-debugging technology refers to techniques that prevent analyzing some parts of binary files in debugging environments by executing different execution flows, or exiting the executions. In Table 1 shows various anti-debugging techniques such as API based antidebugging, hardware based anti-debugging, timing based anti-debugging, etc.
Anti-debugging Techniques
In case of the IsDebubberPresent API which is the most common anti-debugging technique, the API returns the PEB's beingDebugged flag, and using this flag, the process can distinguish whether it is being debugged or not. Most anti-debugging APIs use certain data that judge what information flag contains. There are also time-based anti-debugging techniques that monitor execution delay to find out whether debugging environments are used or not.
Related Work
Most of the existing researches against anti-debugging suggested exploring multi-path or flags in debugger environments. However, these approaches fail to hide debugger environments, even though modifying the analyzing environments similar to PC execution environments. Artem Dinaburg et al., [9] proposed "Ether" implementation hypervisor level of CPU. From controlling the analysis environment outside, the malware may not know the presence of an analyzer. L. Liu et. al., [10] proposed Malyzer, using the shadow process, which monitored other processes running malicious code. Malyzer makes this shadow process invisible to the original suspicious process. As a result, Malyzer defeat anti-debugging techniques. M. N. Gagnon et al., [11] focuses anti-debugging techniques and also suggested ways to protect software. Peter Ferrie [12] explained about various anti-unpacker tricks and described what features it has when the OS environment is differentiated. In addition, he made it easy to infer avoiding debugger environment by checking the flag value. Kawakoyal, Iwamura and Itoh [13] practiced Stealth Debugger, VMM with debugging function, and controlled Time Tick to avoid time checking anti-debugging technology. Xu Chen et. al., [14] also used Stealthy Debuger -used to conceal Virtual Machine, signature or debugger environment -to suggest various ways of avoiding anti-debugging technology. aadp [15] is a plugin for ollydbg and ImmunityDebugger that aims to avoid anti-debugging techniques, such as anti-debugging APIs or flags. J. Lee et al., [16] proposed a basic concept of a rule-based anti-anti-debugging system, but their paper did not have enough experimental data.
Most of the researches focused on concealing debugger usage in dynamic analyze environment or characteristics emerging from virtual machine execution. However, in most of dynamic environment, concealing signature or using other plug-ins takes more time than analyzing the binary itself without environment setting or plug-ins. Moreover concealing the existing analyze environment would make the framework itself useless when it is detected by new anti-debugging technology, and it will cost more expense and time to set new environment.
Our Proposed Method
This section suggests rule structure and whole composition of Evading Anti-debugging techniques method, various ways of detecting anti-debugging technology by analyzing assembly code, patching ways of byte sequence matching.
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Evading Anti-anti-debugging Techniques Method Overview
Figure 1. Evading Anti-anti-debugging Techniques Method Overview
Our Evading Anti-debugging method focuses on detecting and patching to avoid antidebugging techniques based on static analysis. As shown Figure 1 , the method can be split into three steps. First, our rule set is parsed, and an input binary file is disassembled. Next, detection signatures in the rules are searched in assembly instructions, and detected instructions are recorded with offset information. Lastly, locations of the recorded instructions from the previous step are identified in binary files, and the matched byte sequences are modified to new byte sequences according to the patching rules defined in our rule set. In Table 2 , Rule refers to regulations for searching and patching anti -debugging. A rule is composed of 5 parts -Number, Name, Type, KeyWord, Patch_Hex. Number means input sequence when setting the rule, and Name means title of the following anti-debugging. Next, Type gets different assigned number according to whether the anti-debugging rule is API Type, TEB list referred flag, or other. KeyWord means the string value used when searching. It could hold string such as IsDebuggerPresent, or status such as +02h. In status case, sort of the Type is also searched -searching only real flag status. Lastly, Patch_Hex is searched by the rule, and if specific Hex Byte Sequence is evaluated as anti-debugging, the existing Patch_hex is conversed to byte sequence for patching.
Rule Composition
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New anti-debugging techniques emerged when, creating new debugger plug-ins or the debugger's another scripting language to create the time-consuming need. While Depending on composition, add a new rule to the speed of our rule-based method is very fast and flexible.
Anti-debugging Detection Algorithm
Our anti-debugging detection algorithm handles three cases. The first case is to call APIs directly using their addresses. As shown Figure 1 .A, it is the case when call dword ptr [IsDebuggerPresent] appears in assembly instructions. Like most of anti-debugging functions, the IsDebuggerPresent API returns value to the eax register after being called. If the return value is 0, it represents the program is not being debugged, while the return value 1 means the program is on debugging. Therefore, this instruction is widely used to detect debugging environments. In Figure 1 .B, the 'call dword ptr [IsDebuggerPresent]' instruction is replaced by 'xor eax, eax' (33c0) -initializing eax to 0.
Figure 2. Flow Chart of Anti-debugging Detection Algorithm
The second case handles copying dword ptr [IsDebuggerPresent] to a general purpose register before this API is called. While in some cases malware developers copy the above API address to other register to avoid anti-debugging detection. The third case is the case that flags in PEB (Process Environment Block) are directly examined to detect debugging.
The third case is when distinguishing whether it is anti-debugging by using flag values. Figure 3 .D shows process of approaching PEB through fs, and copying beingDebugged flag value to register using +02h. If a register approaches PEB, different flag should be marked like Register of Interest (ROI) concept, and it should be decided whether the Rule could be applied at once, initializing the flag value to 0. A block Diagram and patching methods are described below.
Besides, it shows the process of copying ROI to other registers. The mov command copies ROI and calls it. Patch is necessary for copy call section, since it is doing the same task after all. push, pop and copy operations are executed alike this process.
After this basic detection algorithm, patch using the Hex value specified in the Rule. In the API function case, push operator is used according to the number of parameters, and the Windows API follows stdcall logic -therefore pop(58h) operator is needed accordingly. Thus in the rule, pop should be added according to the number of parameters, to make the pointer indicate proper spot when executing binary. In addition, in some the operating system, anti-debugging APIs address has been changed by offset. In this case, the nearest conditional branches (JNZ) from anti-debugging APIs were replaced by normal branches (JMP) without modifying the call anti-debugging APIs Instruction. 
Experiments
This section explains experimental result of our anti-debugging method. The experiments were performed in a Windows XP environment, and the modified borg disassembler and ollydbg were used. Table 3 , Initially, we create a sample binary file that has various anti -debugging techniques, such as IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, FindWindow, ZwQuery(NtQuery)InformationProcess, BeingDebugged, the Ntglobal flag and the Heap force flag. Then, we tested our Evading Anti -antidebugging method with this sample and the method detected all the anti -debugging techniques except the Heap force flag. The Heap force flag can be detected but canno t be patched because Patch Hex value was oversized compared to the original Hex value. Tables 4 and 5 shows experimental results with malware and commercial software. Most malware was found to have only the IsDebuggerPresent API. But the ZwQuery InformationProcess API was used to in the Trojan.Agent family. Most malware focuses on infecting rather than anti-debugging, so only a simple antidebugging technique is used. Anti-debugging techniques were also used in commercial software, and in most cases, only the IsDebuggerPresent API was detected. 
Anti-debugging Patch Experiment
Patch Verification Experiment
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a rule-based patching method to avoid anti-debugging techniques by analyzing assembly instructions. Our rule-based method, each time a new technology appears, can add or remove anti-anti debugging rules quickly. In addition, because this method do not execute program in debugger environments, it does not be detected by dynamic anti-debugging techniques. After spotting the sections containing anti-debugging instructions, our Evading Anti-debugging techniques tool patches the instructions with new instructions. Experimental results showed that our method can remove anti-debugging instructions from malware. Our future studies will be multi -byte sequence matching to improve processing speed. 
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